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Abstract: 
Nation and diversity are often casted in oppositional terms. The present joint-intervention 
explores the limits and possibilities of what we call ‘inclusive nation’, i.e. a nation which 
embraces rather than expunging diversity. To reflect on this idea, the Loughborough 
University Nationalism Network (LUNN) organized a symposium, bringing together both 
academics and relevant stakeholders, to explore both theoretically and practically the 
feasibility of the inclusive nation. For reason of space, here we present only the theoretical 
views of academics. While Billig and Yuval-Davis highlight the inherent exclusive thrust of 
nationalism, Kaufmann and Hearn suggest two distinct ways to move away the traditional 
understanding of nationalism as a site of singularity, oppression and exclusion. A final 
rejoinder by Nyhagen pushes the debate further interrogating the boundaries of national 
belonging. 
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In the present age of migration, transnational paradigms have gained momentum, often 
dismissing the nation-state as something historically obsolete and politically questionable 
(Soysal 1994, Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Yet, despite important insights from this 
scholarship, social and political life remains largely structured by discourses, practices, and 
institutions articulated at the national scale (Mihelj 2011, Antonsich and Matejskova 2015a). 
This is even more so today, when a re-nationalization process seems to characterize the 
public response to a variety of ‘crises’ (e.g. financial, migratory, terrorist and European). 
Thus, rather than wishing the national away, it is important to understand the ways in which 
this register continues to intervene, both discursively and practically, in the shaping of 
individual and collective life.   
To examine the continued relevance of the national in contemporary societies, the 
Loughborough University Nationalism Network (LUNN), a recently constituted 
interdisciplinary research group, convened a one-day workshop, which took place in 
September 2014 at Loughborough. It brought together a group of academics (Nira Yuval-
Davis, Michael Billig, Eric Kaufmann and Jonathan Hearn) and a group of representatives of 
governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with issues of equality and 
diversity in Britain (Equality and Human Rights Commission; Migrants’ Rights Network; 
Accord Coalition; East Midlands Strategic Migration Partnership; The Race Equality Centre; 
Equalities at Leicester City Council,; Equality and Diversity at Nottingham City Council,; 
Equalities, Community Safety and Cohesion  at Birmingham City Council). The participants 
were invited to engage with the idea of an inclusive nation, one that offers a sense of 
belonging and identity yet also accommodates difference. In a context of increasing ethno-
cultural and religious diversity, spurred by international migration (Alba and Foner 2014), the 
question about how to generate such inclusive nation remains very urgent for many Western 
democracies. Yet, is such a nation possible, and if so, how can we go about conceptualizing 
and fostering it?  
The aim of the workshop was both to start a scholarly conversation on this issue and to 
build a bridge between theoretical reflection and work ‘on the ground’. In this contribution, 
we focus on the first aim, and bring together the perspectives of our invited academic 
colleagues, which offer a useful platform for reflecting on the limits and possibilities of the 
idea of an inclusive nation. While Billig and Yuval-Davis’s contributions are marked by a 
good dose of skepticism, Kaufmann and Hearn are more open to the idea of inclusive nation, 
and point to possible theoretical approaches to the issue. To reconcile these positions and 
push the reflection further, we then asked our LUNN colleague Line Nyhagen to offer a final 
rejoinder. We hope that this joint intervention will serve the purpose of stimulating a 
reflection on two key terms – nation and diversity – which are usually perceived as mutually 
exclusive (Mavroudi 2010, Antonsich and Matejskova 2015b). Yet, we would argue that this 
very opposition ends up reifying the nation as the exclusive domain of xenophobic and ethno-
culturalist discourses, obliterating the spaces, contexts, and happenings of alternative 
understandings of nation. While we do not deny that the nation can, and very often is, 
mobilized as a category of exclusion, we should be wary of limiting ourselves to this reading 
only. Such a narrow reading would obliterate other constellations of diversity and nation, 
including the numerous ways in which diversity can enter and reshape the meaning of the 
nation itself (Modood 2007, Papademetriou 2012, Bloemraad 2014).  
 
 
Nationalism, exclusion and inclusion 
Michael Billig 
Loughborough University 
I should begin by admitting that I have not studied nationalism for a number of years. 
My invitation to contribute to this forum stems from a book which I wrote twenty years ago 
(Billig, 1995). I have not kept up with recent academic developments in the study of 
nationalism nor with new trends in the nature of nationalism itself. Recently I have been 
interested in the language that academic social scientists tend to use (Billig, 2013 and 2015). 
The world of academia has become increasingly competitive and the phrase ‘academic 
capitalism’ seems to describe present conditions well (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004 and 
2009). We like to think that the language of commerce is very different from the language of 
scholarship, although we work in highly managed institutions, which treat academic 
publications as commodities whose monetary value is potentially assessable. It is 
uncomfortable for academics to admit that self-promotional, marketing language might be 
‘normal’ in the university context. I would like to illustrate this with an example relating to 
the study of nationalism. My example is very close to home – or at least to my academic 
home – and, in consequence, is doubly uncomfortable. 
Nationalism as an everyday ideology 
My previous work on nationalism sought to examine the ideological assumptions of 
nationalism. Unlike many others who have looked at nationalism, I was not particularly 
concerned to distinguish between different types of nationalism, such as civic nationalism 
and ethnic nationalism or inclusive and exclusive nationalism. Nor did Banal Nationalism did 
confine itself to examining social movements which are self-consciously nationalist and 
which are dedicated to creating new independent national states. Instead, it examined 
everyday nationalism, or the markers of nationalism which might be found across different 
nations. In this regard, the book was neither taking extreme nationalism as the epitome of 
nationalism in general nor was it seeking to distinguish between the specific forms of 
nationalism but was looking at more general, ideological features of nationalism.  
The notion of ‘ideology’ is crucial. Many years ago, Berger and Luckmann (1967) 
wrote about “the reality of everyday life”, as people take their own everyday world as being 
the world, as if has an objective reality. For some analysts, the concept of ‘ideology’ refers to 
those beliefs and practices by which the social world, constructed by humans, comes to 
appear as if it is natural and thereby unchangeable (see, for instance, Eagleton, 2007). To 
understand nationalist ideology in this sense, it is necessary to go beyond examining this or 
that set of nationalist beliefs, but to see nationalism as an international ideology that has 
spread across the globe. Specific nation states, with their histories, laws of citizenship and 
social myths, do not exist in isolation: they exist within a ‘world of nations’. With the 
exception of Antarctica, it appears ‘natural’ that all the land-mass of the world should be 
divided into different nation states. All forms of nationalism, whether those of nation-states 
existing within this world of nations or those of movements struggling to achieve their own 
national independence, in order to enter this world of nations, take for granted the existence 
of nations as natural. International treaties, agreements and trading areas can only exist within 
this ‘natural’ world of nations. Accordingly, nationalism is globally the dominant form of 
politics and it represents an international ideology, as it has done since the early formation of 
nation states in the modern era. Even such a superficially non-national way of organizing 
politics as the European Union is a union of nations existing within a wider world of nations. 
Although there may be disputes about where the boundaries between nations should be 
drawn, or how nations should treat their citizens or award citizenship, there is virtually no 
dissent from the ‘common-sense’ belief that the world is ‘naturally’ divided into separate 
nations. Thus, the world of nations is taken as ideologically natural. 
Problem of inclusion 
What this means is that nations are inherently exclusionary. Whether a nation’s 
residents are treated in an equally inclusive manner or whether some are considered more 
central than others, it will consider the majority of the world’s people to be outsiders. It is of 
the nature of nations and nation-states that they must necessarily exclude. No nation-state can 
exist in the world of nations and claim the whole world as its citizens. In practice most, if not 
all, nation-states have laws which define who is a citizen and who by implication is excluded 
from citizenship.  
The ‘naturalness’ of this has become apparent in the recent refugee crisis. Millions have 
fled from their own ‘homelands’, principally Syria and Afghanistan. They are not seen to 
belong to any other nation and are not free to choose to belong to another nation. The leaders 
and citizens of the nations, into which they have fled or which they seek to enter, take it as a 
‘natural’ fact that such people they do not properly belong to any other nation except the one 
from which they have fled. It is ‘natural’ in this world of nations to identify such refugees by 
the nation in which they fear to live – as ‘Syrians’, ‘Afghans’, ‘Somalis’. The leaders of some 
nations make ‘benevolent’, ‘humanitarian’ gestures, saying that their nation will be prepared 
to admit a few thousand from the millions of these intrinsic outsiders. The majority of 
refugees have to wait, enduring make-shift tents and harsh climates, until they can be 
returned to the nation to which they ‘naturally’ belong. In the world of nations, they are 
‘naturally’, or rather legally and politically, condemned to remain unwanted, excluded 
outsiders. 
All this is backed by an ideology that takes the exclusionary nature of nations to be 
natural. This is not the product of this nationalism or that nationalism, as if particular forms 
of nationalism can be blamed for the response from the nations of the world. It stems from 
the fundamentally exclusive ideology of nationalism tout court.  
Academic language 
One might ask how does this relate to issues about academic language. It concerns the 
balance between the positive term ‘inclusion’ and the negative term ‘exclusion’. As 
academics, we work in institutions that are increasingly driven by commercial factors. We are 
constantly encouraged to conduct the sort of research that will enable us to bring research 
funds to our institutions. University managers warn young academics that they will not obtain 
promotion unless they obtain sufficient research monies. In consequence, academics have an 
interest in using the sort of language that attracts grants and this tends to be a language of 
positives rather than negatives. 
My own university has decided to group the university’s research priorities under six 
‘Research Challenges’, favouring projects that fit one or more of these approved challenges. 
Basically, these challenges are phrased in positive language: such as ‘Secure and Resilient 
Societies’, ‘Health and Well-Being’, ‘Communication, Culture and Citizenship’. Negative, or 
potentially negative terms, such as ‘insecurity’, ‘disease’, ‘refugee’ or other problem terms do 
not appear in these titles. This cannot be a coincidence. The positive words creates the image 
of a positive world which the university’s research can help bring about.  
The University web-site describes its Research Challenges in positive terms: “These 
challenges provide a framework for enhancing interdisciplinary research; accelerating the 
delivery of distinctive solutions to regional, national and international challenges and 
becoming a catalyst for growth.” (http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/challenges/). Even the 
notion of a ‘challenge’ (rather a ‘problem’) is itself suitably positive. Who could possibly 
prefer problems to challenges? 
Research into nationalism basically fits the Challenge of ‘Communication, Culture and 
Citizenship’. Here the semantic preference for inclusion over exclusion becomes clear. The 
opening paragraph describing this Challenge mentions that communication can bring people 
together and tear them apart and that we need to understand the processes of “inclusion and 
exclusion”. After the opening paragraph comes ‘Loughborough’s Contribution’ and this is 
where the word ‘exclusion’ gives way to ‘inclusion’: “We address the problematics of 
inclusion…, the performance of inclusion…and the practices of inclusion (the development 
of innovative strategies, policies and products that promote greater opportunity, equality and 
participation).” The web-site asserts that “social inclusion is one of the topics around which 
our expertise clusters.” Semantically ‘exclusion’ itself has become excluded. 
This tendency to use optimistic, positive language suggests that problems can be 
solved, or at least partially solved, with further research. Saying that nationalism is 
fundamentally exclusive suggests a lack of optimism that the problems of nationalism can be 
resolved without radical change. Political leaders and grant-awarding bodies like to imagine 
that they are spending money wisely, accomplishing much while changing little. 
Accordingly, there are political and financial reasons for using positive language in the 
necessary pursuit of research funding. In these conditions it is easy to overlook the general 
exclusive ideology of nationalism; this neglect will itself appear natural and, accordingly, is 
by its nature ideological. 
 
Inclusive nationalism  
Nira Yuval-Davis 
University of East London 
The project of inclusive nationalism is virtually impossible to construct on full 
egalitarian basis, which does not mean, however, that it is not a worthwhile goal to aspire to 
and engage in. The issue is how to build inclusive convivial national solidarity as a normative 
aspiration and as a social and political process in practice which would take into account 
differential social, political and economic power relations and would encompass the situated 
intersectional gazes of as many segments of society as possible (Yuval-Davis, 2011). 
Before discussing national solidarity, however, we need to recognize that such 
solidarity is always constructed around some kind of assumed boundaries of the nation. These 
can be more or less inclusive, more or less permeable, but they always divide the world into 
‘us’ and ‘them’. Rabindranath Tagore defined nationalism as ‘organized selfishness’ (cited in 
Mishra, 2014) and Lea Greenfeld (1992) described the one characteristic common to all kinds 
of nationalist ideologies which is that they always see their nation as superior to all others. So 
the project of ‘inclusive nationalism’ would always be a bit paradoxical. 
Different theories and projects of nationalism view national solidarity and boundaries 
as constructed around different themes and developed different typologies. In my work on the 
politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2011) I demonstrated three different kinds of contested 
British notions of national solidarity – the Enoch Powell kind, which is constructed around 
common ‘blood’ or descent; the Norman Tibbet and his ‘cricket test’ kind, which is built 
around emotional and cultural solidarity; and the New Labour one (that David Cameron 
shares as well), which is constructed around shared values. In the third case, cosmopolitan 
values such as democracy and respect of human rights are used to demonstrate British 
superiority vs other nations. 
A potentially crucial insight regarding inclusive nationalism has been Otto Bauer’s 
(2001[1924]) work. Unlike other nationalism theorists who saw national solidarity built 
around a notion of common origin, Otto Bauer emphasized the notion of common destiny. 
The notion of common destiny can be seen as a ‘natural’ outcome of common origin, but it 
can also be caused as a result of civic and other kinds of unifying ideologies. These can be a 
crucial focus of contestation in pluralist societies. For instance, in the former Yugoslavia, 
people lived together comfortably as part of the same village and nation in spite of a common 
knowledge of different origins and religions. The civil war and the massacres of former 
neighbours and friends took place when different origins started to signify different zero-sum 
destinies. 
In relation to this I would like to report on an interesting debate which took place in a 
recent conference that the Centre for Research on Migration, Refugees and Belonging 
(CMRB) – the research centre I direct – co-organized with SOAS on anti-Jewish and anti-
Muslim racisms and the question of Palestine/Israel 
(http://www.uel.ac.uk/cmrb/publications.htm). On one side of the debate were those who 
argued that it was racism against Jews not to agree with the Zionist demand of the Jewish 
right for self determination and the definition of Israel as a Jewish state. On the other side 
were those who argued that it was racist to define Israel as a Jewish state because rather than, 
or not only, has Zionism been a movement for national liberation of the Jews, but it has been 
a settler colonial society, and all contemporary settler societies – from the USA to South 
Africa to Australia – do not define their national project around a unitary ethnic, national or 
religious origin. 
Moving back to Europe, in the current refugees’ crisis, it was interesting how the 
discourse of solidarity crossed national boundaries in different ways, even when not 
establishing explicitly exclusionary boundaries, as the Hungarian Prime Minister had done, in 
the name of keeping Hungary – and Europe – Christian. In many of the German and other 
liberal discourses of solidarity with the refugees, as reported on TV and other media, the key 
argument was constructed around the notion of the refugees from Syria as deserving 
solidarity because they are ‘people like us’ – not just because of their plight. The description 
always emphasized that most of the Syrian refugees were professionals and other educated 
middle class people, who would easily assimilate and were fit to belong to their receiving 
nations. On the other hand, David Cameron’s discourse was of a humanist solidarity, based 
on the ‘deserving poor’ – the genuine needing refugees in the camps and the disabled – the 
superior charitable British nation would help the deserving poor who cannot help themselves 
(unlike those who can and thus arrived to Europe as illegal migrants as no legal routes were 
open to them). This is a discourse in which the boundaries of belonging are firmly drawn and 
the assumption is that each nation has its own spatial place on the globe and the least 
movement (at least in the direction to Britain) the better. 
The last point I want to discuss here relates to one of our main findings in the 
EUBorderscapes research project in which I am involved, leading the work package on 
‘everyday bordering’. While part of our work related to people living on and crossing state 
borders – in the UK between Calais and Dover – we also studied everyday bordering in 
London (we also made a film about this ‘everyday borders’ which can be watched here: 
http://www.uel.ac.uk/news/press-releases/2015/05/-everyday-borders-feature.htm). 
In relation to this I want to discuss the paradox that the more securitisation measures 
are taken in order for everyone living legally in the UK to feel safe and at home where they 
belong, the more these feelings of safety, comfort and conviviality of living in pluralist 
multicultural Britain are being undermined, and inclusive constructions of the nation get 
further away than ever. The task before us is to find a way to make people feel comfortable 
and safe without destroying trust based on what Durkheim has called pre-contractual 
solidarity which is a necessary condition for any collective action. In order to do so, we need 
to encompass into our notion of national inclusivity the situated intersectional gazes of all 
members of the society and recognize the multi-layered and cross-borders belonging of us all. 
 
From Multiculturalism to Multivocalism: complexity, national identity and 
political theory 
Eric Kaufmann, Birkbeck College, University of London 
 I claim national identities in liberal societies increasingly resemble complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) rather than state-directed collective representations. Complex systems are 
phenomena, such as flocks of birds or traffic patterns that emerge from the uncoordinated 
actions of the actors or components underneath. Order emerges from chaos due to the 
minimal coordination provided by simple rules (i.e. stay a certain distance from the next bird) 
or mechanisms, such as prices in a market (Urry 2005). No ‘lead’ individual imagines the 
whole much less directs it.  
Recent scholarship in nationalism increasingly privileges the emergence of national 
identity ‘from below’ as opposed to from state elites ‘above’ (i.e. Edensor 2002; Fox 2014). 
This chimes well with the complexity model. A central aspect of complexity theory is the 
principle of distributed information, that the ‘brain’ of the whole cannot be located in any one 
component. In guessing the number of beans in a jar, or who will win a horse race, adding up 
the sum of everyone’s guesses and dividing by the number of participants provides an answer 
nearly as good as the winning guess. The point is that the collective ‘wisdom of crowds’ 
cannot be pinned down to any single individual (Surowiecki 2004). This is directly relevant 
to the conception of national identity insofar as I claim national identity is a complex system 
that cannot be read off any one individual, institution or document. Class, region, ethnicity, 
gender and other vantage points act as lenses, focusing a person’s attention on particular 
symbols of the national canon rather than others (Kaufmann 2008). Like Cohen’s (1996) 
‘personal nationalism’, the national identity inheres in the sum of individual experience, in 
other words, in the whole. 
Contemporary Debates in the Normative Political Theory of Nationalism 
Normative theorising of national identity has entered a cul-de-sac, in which proponents 
of liberal nationalism and multiculturalism face each other from entrenched redoubts. 
Multiculturalists seek equal public recognition for ethnic communities, which demands that 
the nation be defined in a ‘thin’, inoffensive way on the basis of shared universals such as 
toleration and liberty (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1992). Those who champion liberal 
nationalism urge a ‘thicker’ set of symbols and narratives, notably a shared language or 
history, to inspire democratic participation, social cohesion and the sharing necessary for a 
welfare state (Miller 1995; Tamir 1993). Liberal nationalists shy away from including 
exclusive criteria such as majority group ancestry as part of what it means to be a member of 
the nation, but many in fact attach to the nation through their majority ethnicity. For instance, 
over half the respondents to the British Social Attitudes Survey replied that having British 
ancestry was an important part of being British (Park et. al. 2014). Where multiculturalism is 
insufficiently sensitive to minority demands, liberal nationalism falls short for many in the 
ethnic majority. 
 How might the 'wisdom of crowds' help us escape the zero-sum condition in which 
the political theory of cultural diversity is entangled? The key lies with individuals' and 
groups' distinctive perspectives on the nation, and hence the rich lode of distributed 
information that a grasp of complexity can help to unlock. 
Complexity and Political Theory: Toward Multinationalism 
 Is liberal nationalism the best we can do in a world of competing demands? Certainly, 
if we limit ourselves to a one-size-fits-all understanding of national identity in which all 
members of the polity must subscribe to a unitary conception of political identity. Liberal 
nationalism arguably strikes a more acceptable note for western elites than either 
multiculturalism or ethnic nationalism, but it fails to satisfy most citizens, who cannot see 
their conception of the nation fully reflected in it.  
 Complexity theory contends that national identity is an emergent property of groups 
and individuals, even as the state is an important voice in the conversation. This means no 
two individuals glimpse the nation from precisely the same point. Victor Turner used the 
term multivocal to refer to the multiplicity of meanings a given symbol like the Stars and 
Stripes may evoke in a population (Turner 1967). Accordingly, a multivocalist ethics of 
identity avers that information about a nation's identity is distributed among a population. So 
long as the state sets out a minimal set of civic criteria akin to market rules, the detail can be 
filled in by the interaction of individuals and groups. Nationalism becomes crowdsourced.  
The position of the state in this emergent, flexible nationalism is neutral but proactive. 
Its aim should be to set out a common minimum to which all subscribe: the proper name of 
the country, its borders, perhaps a lingua franca, and a thin set of values, which in the West 
involves a generalised respect for liberty, equality and democracy. Under a multivocalist 
dispensation, the state maintains a stance of 'constructive ambiguity'i which validates a 
variety of mutually incompatible national visions: ethnic, civic, multicultural. This does not 
address legal questions such as whether to ban the burqa, or how to placate violent 
secessionists, but it ministers to much broader symbolic concerns among those seeking to 
square their ethnic and national identities. 
 In Northern Ireland, for instance, constructive ambiguity refers to the fact protagonists 
had divergent political ambitions so framers of a deal needed to be flexible. The architects of 
the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) sensed that an ambiguously-worded document would 
permit both Unionist and Nationalist politicians to better sell the agreement to their respective 
constituencies. Each side could interpret the GFA optimistically, as either a step on the road 
to a United Ireland (for Nationalists) or, for Unionists, a firmer guarantee of Northern 
Ireland's place within the United Kingdom (Powell 2008). 
 A form of constructive ambiguity is a constitutive aspect of many political parties. 
The result is a high degree of ecological diversity within them. In a decentralised party 
system like Canada’s, constituency associations owe little to central office beyond a common 
electoral loyalty. This can result in associations with radically different social bases or issue 
positions coexisting in close proximity (Carty 2002). Within the British Labour party, there 
are glaring contradictions between the views of traditionalist Muslims, university-educated 
feminists and white-working class trade unionists. Yet so long as these forces are sequestered 
within different constituency associations - 'franchises' controlled by one or other group - 
their contradictions remain latent and can be contained within the party while focusing 
diverse actors' energies on a smaller set of shared political objectives. Activists in each 
branch read what they wish into its brand: they may believe the party stands for their 'thick' 
values (defense of Muslim concerns, feminism, white working-class culture) guaranteeing 
party loyalty, even as the only planks which emerge at national level are the 'thin' common 
denominators such as economic redistribution and opposition to the Conservative Party.  
 The social movements’ literature likewise recognises the power of flexibility and 
localism in satisfying diverse actors. Resource mobilisation theory claims that organisations 
whose structure is decentred to permit maximal diversity of outlook, with considerable 
discursive (and some policy) leeway devolved to movement branches, are more successful 
and adaptable. Interpretations of doctrine and strategy are tailored to local conditions, 
permitting the organisation to harness local knowledge and swiftly respond to changes in the 
environment.  
 We have seen that the debate between liberal nationalism and multiculturalism in 
advanced Western societies lends itself to symbolic solutions, notably a multivocalist 
approach based on constructive ambiguity. Multivocalism is distinct from multiculturalism 
because while identities are multiple, these focus on the nation as their reference point rather 
than the ethnic homeland, thus strengthening social solidarity while allowing scope for 
diversity. A multivocalist approach also diverges from thin accounts of solidarity such as 
negative liberalism or constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1992). Though the state is neutral 
toward most conceptions of the nation, it proactively validates and expresses the rich 
diversity of national identities. By contrast, constitutional patriotism remains restricted to 
formal constitutional-legal abstractions.  
 Multivocalism’s byword is flexibility, a tailor-made national identity. To return to the 
British example, a white Briton in a market town may experience a 'thick' Britain seamlessly 
connected to her English ethnicity; a mixed-race suburbanite may view it as an equally 'thick' 
melting pot linked to her mixed ancestry, a futuristic nation-in-the-making. Neither readily 
identifies with multiculturalism. On the other hand, a Somali immigrant in inner London, a 
Scot or a Welshman might see Britain as a 'thin' outer layer to their identity. For them Britain 
is a multicultural entity whose cultural reality lies in its parts, even if irreducibly British 
symbols such as the monarchy and NHS also exist. The ‘truth’ lies in all three accounts. 
 If national identity is a complex system that emerges from below, narrow official 
versions of national identity are bound to be frustrated. Instead, we need to contemplate a 
world in which the nation can be multicultural, civic and ethnic, all at once. Politicians may 
propound a civic vision in front of a national audience but should validate competing 
conceptions to divergent local audiences. For instance, a Prime Minister might praise the 
global mix of cultures in London at one moment, the magic of integration and intermarriage 
the next, and still comment favourably, as did a former Prime Minister, John Major, on the 
settled continuity of England’s villages and leafy suburbs. Each message will be eagerly 
received by those tuned to its frequency and ignored by most others. People generally hear 
what they want to hear, forming attachments to the whole in their own way. 
 Politicians can remain elusive about the essence of the nation, validating wide 
differences in the way it is perceived. Americans form attachments to different Americas: its 
politicians should reflect this. This makes it easier for citizens to emotionally commit to the 
whole, so the process becomes less forced and unnatural. A top-down approach which 
attempts to enumerate a defined set of characteristics flattens and alienates minorities who 
wish to maintain their culture as well as members of the ethnic majority who consider their 
ancestry and national identity to be seamlessly connected. Symbolism is flexible in a way 
power and resources are not. While states’ national identity projects are buffeted by political 
and economic considerations, the normative aim should be to surmount this: to construct a 
national whole which permits a maximum of freedom while ensuring the greatest amount of 
solidarity. In this, multivocalism is clearly preferable to the liberal nationalist and 
multiculturalist alternatives. 
 
'Strong and Weak Civic Identity, and the Management of Conflict in 
Liberal Societies' 
Jonathan Hearn 
University of Edinburgh 
 
The workshop asked us to consider whether: ‘the nation can be seen as a way to help 
bridge differences and create inclusion, and, if so, how best to do this in the context of 
increasingly diverse societies.’  Implicit here is an assumption that the problematic is being 
articulated in terms of the situation of characteristically ‘civic’ and ‘liberal’ forms of the 
nation.  Some nations are premised in part on exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or 
ideology.  However these would seem to fall outside the inquiry, ‘beyond the pale’.  Here we 
are concerned with nations that are defined less along strong and impermeable ethnic or 
cultural lines, and more amenable to inclusion in the first instance.  Without being naïve or 
starry-eyed, I think we can agree that the UK and Western Europe are generally located more 
at the liberal/civic end of the spectrum of national forms.   
This raises the initial question: how do such nations normally achieve inclusion?  Even 
within this broad form we can identify variations.   For the rest of these remarks I will sketch 
two broadly recognized ‘ideal types’, characteristic ways that liberal nation-states have dealt 
with the problem of inclusion. I will then offer a third way of thinking about this question.  I 
treat in turn concepts of: (1) ‘Strong Civic Identity’, (2) ‘Weak Civic (or civil) Identity’, and 
(3) liberal society as a form of ‘Managed Conflict’ (cf. Hall 1995). 
(1) ‘Strong Civic Identity’ 
In this model, the way is open to join the nation, but the cultural tariff is relatively high.  
One is expected to master the dominant language and subscribe to a core set of civic values.  
Among those values is likely to be the idea that society is intrinsically secular and that 
religion is a private matter.  We might call this the ‘French model’.  The long-running 
controversy around the use of the headscarf in France is indicative (Joppke 2007, Killian 
2003).  In terms of social theory, we might also call it the Parsonian model, because of the 
way echoes Talcott Parson’s (1951) structural-functionalist conception of society as 
something held together by shared orientation to core values.  Without in any way condoning 
recent atrocities committed against French people, we can observe how the attack on the staff 
of the magazine Charlie Hebdoe, and the slaughter in Paris on 13 November, 2015, have been 
articulated in public discourse not just as murderous tactics in a terrorist war, but as attacks 
on sacred values of the French nation and state.  The response is to defend not just the French 
people, but moreover these defining values. 
 (2) ‘Weak Civic (or ‘civil’) Identity’.   
In this model, the core values are less sharply articulated, and the ethos is built more 
around the avoidance of conflict. A greater degree of non-integration is tolerated in terms of 
language, public religiosity, and so on, but this is not so much a matter of principle, as a kind 
of studied indifference to difference.  There is a ‘live and let live’ attitude, and tolerance 
rather than integration is the watchword.  We might call this the ‘British model’.  This is not 
to say that tensions do not arise around issues of immigration and relatively culturally un-
integrated communities.  It is simply that these tensions tend not to elicit the same degree of 
assertion of core values in response.  If we were to look for an emblematic social theory to go 
with this model, it might be that of F. A. Hayek (2013), with its confidence that as long as 
certain institutions (markets, justice) are in place, diversity will take care of itself, varying 
needs and interests will get worked out, without the need for strong shared value orientations.   
These are ideal types—neither France nor Britain conforms neatly to these ‘models’, 
and of course, aspects of both can be found in either country.  Other liberal, capitalist, 
democratic nation-states may be more difficult to place in terms of this polarity.   Both 
models get advanced through public education: one can promote the acquisition of core 
values, or the acceptance of wide differences, and to a degree, both at the same time.  The 
underlying point is that liberalism in practice is paradoxically both a strong value and an 
agnosticism towards values, and this plays out differently in different historical, cultural, and 
political contexts.  With these ideal types I am trying to highlight a tension between the 
engagement and avoidance of conflict around liberal values.  For the rest of these remarks I 
would like to suggest that more thought should be given to a third ‘model’, what we might 
call ‘managed conflict’.  I present this not as ‘another way of doing it’, but as an argument 
about of how all such societies actually operate, and therefore as a set of conditions that must 
be taken into account. 
 (3) ‘Managed Conflict’.   
I want to suggest that an important part of what integrates liberal forms of society is not 
just shared values, or a pluralistic attitude towards values, but a cultural complex of 
conventions for channeling the inherent conflicts of interest that characterize such societies.  
Markets and democratic procedures channel contending claims over limited goods in 
economics and politics.  Public opinion, sustained by media and other opinion forming 
organisations in civil society, is an arena in which ideas, beliefs, and even tastes, come into 
contention with one another; are proliferated and winnowed.  This is a central dynamic of 
liberal society.  Here I hark back to a classic theme in social theory—that conflict not only 
disrupts, but also integrates (Simmel 1964, Gluckman 1955, Coser 1956, Collins and Annett 
1975).  As encoded in the British parliamentary notion of the ‘loyal opposition’, where actors 
are committed to the ‘rules of the game’ by which conflicts are negotiated, by which 
compromise is reached, conflict itself can tighten social bonds.   
There are two key ways, fundamental to social structure, in which conflict gets 
‘managed’ in liberal forms of society.  First, via the public/private divide.  A strong 
distinction here is basic to liberal societies, conjoined with the strong role of private property 
in the organization of the economy, and the idea of the state, in the sense of res publica, as a 
common public project.  Along with property, many aspects of body and mind are similarly 
regarded as private matters, over which only the individual has domain.  By having clear 
boundaries of domain, public and private, some issues can be rendered private matters, and 
effectively steered out of conflict between actors, left as matters of personal choice.  But of 
course, this only goes so far.  Much conflict will always happen around the precise definition 
of the boundary between private and public, and anything defined as public is potentially a 
focus of conflict, as diverging views of the public interest and good contend.  The 
public/private divide is no magic solution, but it does help define more precisely where the 
conflicts lie. One of the key questions is to what degree ethnic and cultural differences can be 
channeled into the private sphere, and to what degree they necessarily impinge on the public 
(Rex 1997).  For instance in many cases it is easier to privatize religious belief and practice, 
than it is to treat language use as a matter of choice in the public sphere.   Conflicts around 
the public/private boundary do not necessarily involve cultural or ethnic differences.  The 
basic tensions between left and right politics in such societies, between the respective roles of 
the state and the market, itself fundamentally involves understandings of this boundary.  So 
cultural difference is just one of the things that may or may not be effectively managed by 
being channeled out of the public domain, or trigger debates over where the boundary 
properly lies. 
The second key way conflict gets managed in liberal society is by incorporating groups 
into legitimate competitive spheres.  Such societies are premised on the idea that the 
outcomes of competitive institutional contests are just, as long as they are fairly conducted 
and there is a ‘level playing field’.  Though some will gain and some will lose, if the means 
by which these outcomes are seen as valid, the wider society is correspondingly validated.  
Much conflict is organized around interests and values that are not cultural or ethnic.  This 
can be in terms of (again) a left-right political spectrum, class, geographic cores and 
peripheries, and group affiliations with large corporate institutions, bureaucracies, and 
economic sectors.  However cultural differences and recent immigration can become one of 
the factors defining conflicts over values and interests.  If so, these are as legitimate a basis 
for political mobilization, and competition for social goods, as many others.  Perhaps counter-
intuitively, formalizing the competition for jobs, housing, education by such groups may do 
more to integrate them into the system than pretending such competition doesn’t exist.  Full 
citizens ‘enjoy’ the right to compete with each other.  Thus the generation of campaigning 
groups, lobbying organisations, and even political parties around ethnic group interests may 
be a necessary stage for bedding in conflict in the forms of more routinized competition. 
One very real problem here however, is that if ‘indigenous’ populations (i.e. ‘white’ 
working classes) are relatively atomised and not inclined to mobilise collectively around their 
class or local interests, then they may feel threatened by ‘other’ groups better organized 
around their own interests.  For the binding power of regulated conflict in the form of 
competition to work, there needs to be widespread organisation into active groups mobilized 
around particular interests.  And there need to be recognized and legitimated institutional 
arenas for competing for resources and negotiating conflict.  My point is that liberal 
nationhood involves not the suppression of conflict, either by overriding core values or 
indulgence of difference, but the institutionalization of conflict in the form of legitimated 
competition.  
None of this is meant to imply that liberal societies are well-oiled machines that by 
their nature fairly manage all social conflict.  They are not.  They are haphazardly evolved 
social forms that have elaborated certain institutions and mechanisms for managing conflict, 
in the context of social diversity and often shifting and weak allegiance to centralised power.  
Economic inequality and maldistribution of justice are chronic features of such societies, 
which threaten their cohesion.  But as observed at the outset, they are the kind of societies 
that primarily concern us in regard to the present topic.  They are what we have to work with.  
If the problem is how to build inclusive nations in the context of diversity, then answers will 
have to be sought by mobilising the deep structures of such societies to that purpose.  Cries 
for shared values, or tolerance, will only go so far.  Inclusion in liberal forms of society 
means integration into established institutions for the management of conflict. 
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Across diverse lines of social scientific inquiry addressing privilege and disadvantage, 
inclusion and exclusion, belonging and alienation, an increased attention to ‘the everyday’ 
can be observed, exemplified by notions such as ‘lived citizenship’ (Lister 2003), ‘lived 
religion’ (Orsi 1997) and lived nations or ‘everyday nationhood’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss 
2008). These bottom-up approaches acknowledge that people’s experiences of inclusion and 
exclusion are context-dependent and mediated by multiple and intersecting forms of 
identities, loyalties and belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006). In this brief comment piece, written 
from the context of the United Kingdom, I argue that studies of lived nations must pay more 
attention to power, privilege and domination. 
Within studies of nations and nationalism there has been a shift from asking about the 
‘when’ and ‘what’ to the ‘how’ and ‘where’ (Antonsich 2015), but all of these interrogating 
terms continue to be of importance to contemporary nationhood (e.g., the when and what 
question was recently challenged in the context of the referendum on Scottish independence 
from the United Kingdom; and the how and where question is currently debated in relation to 
the United Kingdom’s membership status and position within the European Union).  
A further key question emerging in recent scholarly literature is that of ‘whose nation?’ 
The British nation as a whole is (still) predominantly white, and the majority population 
continues to be invoked as the nation’s ‘we’. Findings from the 2013 British Social Attitudes 
survey, for example, reveal that being ‘truly British’ for the survey participants means 
speaking English (95%), having pre-dominantly lived in Britain (77%), having been born in 
Britain (74%), and having ‘British ancestry’ (51%), where such ancestry is not explicitly 
defined but is likely to implicitly refer to the dominant ethnic group - whites (Kiss and Park 
2014: 5; see also Kaufmann, this volume). These results indicate that people more generally 
(and not only those who may sympathize with the likes of Enoch Powell; see Yuval-Davis, 
this volume), tend to associate national belonging with common ‘blood’ or descent. They also 
illustrate a continuous process of ‘othering’ of ethnic minority individuals and groups 
(regardless of their country of birth); supporting the perception that white people ‘were here 
first’ and thus count as ‘truly British’, while black and other ethnic minority people have 
subsequently arrived as visitors or guests who do not fully belong. In policy terms, the 
government has focused on newcomers’ responsibility to adapt, to integrate and to fit in, with 
less attention to the majority population’s willingness and ability to adapt to and welcome 
new citizens. As a nation, the United Kingdom remains exclusionary in both political and 
everyday terms via the discursive positioning of both existing ethnic minorities and new 
groups of migrants as ‘others’ who are not in a position to claim primordial belonging.  
Increased academic and political attention must be paid to the ways in which patterns of 
power and privilege remain obstacles to an inclusive nation. Calls have been issued for 
scholars to consider ethnic majorities as well as ethnic minorities in studies of nations and 
nationalism (e.g., Skey 2013; Goode and Stroup 2015). In this regard, the notion of a 
minimum set of shared values, the acceptance of a ‘multi-vocalist ethics of identity’ and a 
discursively ambiguous state that caters to the interests of several stakeholders (Kaufmann, 
this volume) -- addresses the actual diversity of the population’s lived nation, but it does not 
adequately deal with issues of power, privilege and inequality. A discursive repositioning of 
the state towards a ‘constructive ambiguity’ may be necessary, but it is not sufficient in order 
to produce socio-economic justice as well as a shared feeling of belonging.  
Hearn (this volume) proposes ‘managed conflict’ as a ‘third way’ of working towards 
inclusive nations. His approach specifically acknowledges ‘conflicts of interest’ between 
groups and individuals in liberal democratic societies, including the United Kingdom. As 
such, it has the potential to address how different groups and individuals are situated within 
the multiple nexuses of advantage and disadvantage that characterize Britain. According to 
Hearn (this volume), liberal societies manage conflict via ‘the public/private divide’ and ‘by 
incorporating groups into legitimate competitive spheres’ (ibid.). In this vision of how 
conflict is managed, the (corporate) state has a crucial role in that it recognizes and invites 
participation from economic actors (e.g., businesses and trade unions) and political actors 
(e.g., voluntary sector groups engaging in political mobilization for particular interests). What 
this vision omits to consider, however, is that the corporate state tends to listen to male-
dominated interests, while the voices and interests of women and other disadvantaged groups 
are often marginalized or not even heard at all. Hearn also suggests that conflict is best 
managed via a strict separation between the public and the private spheres, where property, as 
well as the body and the mind, are perceived as private, while the state is seen as a collective 
and public endeavor. Again, this conflict management strategy poses a problem, as it is 
difficult to argue and sustain a clear distinction between what is private and what is public. 
Women’s movement activists and feminist scholars alike have long made the point that ‘the 
personal is political’ and have mobilized to politicize domestic violence, contraception, 
abortion, sexual intimacy and other bodily issues. What may count as private and as public is 
not only a gendered matter but also a matter of political contestation. Moreover, the notion 
that religion belongs to the private sphere (as an issue of ‘the mind’), has come under critique 
by scholars who claim that it can play a legitimate role in democratic deliberation (e.g., 
Habermas 2006), and it is also being undermined by the fact that faith-based organizations 
deliver significant welfare services (Bäckström and Davie 2010). A strict delineation between 
the religious and the secular is also met with challenges by narratives that acknowledge and 
examine ‘the interaction of religious and Enlightenment values’ (Mack 2003: 161).  
In our quest for more inclusive nations, we also need to address issues of economic and 
cultural justice. The question of ‘whose nation?’ is tied to redistribution (Fraser 1997), as 
exemplified by current debates about limitations to access to in-work benefits for non-UK 
European citizens living in the UK. It is also linked to the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis 
2006; see also Skey 2013) and to perceptions of who legitimately expresses ‘true 
Britishness’. Privilege is thus rearticulated and reinforced in everyday expressions of nation 
and nationalism, or in experiences of the ‘lived nation’. We need a bottom-up approach that 
examines how dominant and minoritized groups experience and live nation and nationhood. 
We also need a complementary top-down perspective that focuses on how the state 
discursively positions itself and on how the state consults with interest groups and 
redistributes resources to groups and individuals. What and who, when and where, are 
recognized as Britain and as British? Whose nation is it? In conclusion, we need to study the 
boundaries of belonging by focusing on patterns of disadvantage and exposing forms of 
exclusion, but also by interrogating forms of power, privilege and domination that continue to 
perpetuate the ideology of the nation and nationhood as belonging to the dominant ethnic 
group rather than to everyone who lives in the nation. 
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i The term constructive ambiguity is credited to Henry Kissinger and is often used in peace 
negotiations (Powell 2008) 
